We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price e¢ciency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate prior information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We nd that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improving the precision of prior information is a more e¢cient way to do so. More accurate prior information decreases asymmetric information problems and consequently reduces the informativeness of prices, while a more accurate public signal increases price informativeness. The volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal. Finally, expected welfare can sometimes fall as prior information or the public signal become more precise.
Introduction
In recent years, regulations have been implemented in nancial markets throughout the world designed to induce improved information provision in order to reduce existing uncertainty about the fundamentals of publicly traded rms. There are two alternative means available to regulators trying to stimulate better information provision. The rst involves tightening the standards of information dissemination of publicly traded rms. This is achieved by improving the precision of the prior information available to all investors about asset value. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is an example of a regulation designed to provide investors with more accurate accounting information.
The second way to improve information provision is to enhance the transparency of the market.
The main argument for this alternative is that uncertainty is more about the actions of competing investors than about fundamentals, and so enhancing transparency can be achieved by providing all market participants better access to information about the information held by their competitors.
This can involve giving access to more information about the order book, order imbalances, or about all the transactions that have taken place in the market. For example, in April of 1990 the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) established a computerized system, Market by Price, to disseminate real-time detailed information on the limit order book to the public. In particular it provided information on the depth and quotes for the current inside market and also depth and limit order prices for up to four price levels above and below the current market, and it automatically displayed all depth (see Madhavan et al., 2005 for further details). The London Stock Exchange has experimented with di¤erent regimes for the publication of last-traded prices (see Gemmill, 1996) .
The objective of this paper is to determine the ways in which these two means of improving information provision a¤ect market performance. We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance when regulators can decrease uncertainty about fundamentals by improving information provision in one of the two ways described above. In our setup, regulators can provide investors with more accurate prior information about the assets value by improving the precision of all private signals, and/or can enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our model improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the information of others.
Moreover, because expectations are rational in our set up, pre-trade information, for instance from the order book or order imbalances, contains no additional information than would be revealed in equilibrium. We therefore focus on the provision of post-trade information about past transactions such as last-traded prices.
We consider the e¤ect of these alternatives on di¤erent measures of market performance. We focus on market depth, price e¢ciency, volume of trade, and ex-ante expected welfare. Improving the precision of prior information or increasing the level of transparency in the market always increases market depth. However, the e¤ect of increasing transparency is less important than the e¤ect of increasing the precision of prior information. In the limit, while very precise prior information results in an innitely deep market, increasing market transparency results in a level of market depth that is bounded from above. The reason is that the informational content of each of the alternatives is di¤erent. Improving information provision by increasing the precision of prior information directly a¤ects the trading strategies of agents, while enhancing market transparency does so only indirectly by a¤ecting the precision of their information about their competitors signals and the information they infer from the equilibrium price.
Turning to the e¤ect of improved information provision on price e¢ciency we nd that price efciency is decreasing in improvements in the accuracy of prior information. More accurate prior information reduces price e¢ciency since the availability of higher quality information implies that the information transmitted by prices is less important. The opposite e¤ect occurs when the market is made more transparent. The provision of the public signal compensates for the reduction of information asymmetries.
Next we examine the e¤ect of improving the precision of prior information or increasing the level of transparency on the volume of trade that takes place in equilibrium. We nd that the volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal.
Finally, to study the e¤ect on expected welfare we turn to numerical analysis since analytical 3 analysis is intractable. Our simulations show that improving information provision is not always welfare increasing. In particular, we show that starting with very imprecise prior information and/or a very opaque market, improving the precision of prior information, and/or enhancing the transparency of the market will cause expected welfare to fall up to a point, after which expected welfare will increase. The reason is that in our framework expectations are rational and investors are imperfectly competitive and so improving information can eliminate potential informational rents.
We are not the rst to study these issues. In the market microstructure literature, researchers have examined the impact of increasing nancial market transparency on market performance. Theoretical (Pagano and Röell 1996 , Madhavan 1995 , and Baruch 2005 , empirical (Gemmill 1996, Porter and Weaver 1998, and Madhavan et al. 2005 ) and experimental (Bloomeld and OHara 1999, and Flood et al. 1999 ) studies reached mixed conclusions about the impact of transparency on nancial markets. In all of these studies transparency is dened as the information that the market or some participants should disclose in order to increase the information shared between agents.
This transparency can be either pre-trade (for instance information about the book) or post-trade (for instance information on past trades). All of this information will a¤ect the trading behavior of agents because it allows information about the trading strategies of competitors to be shared. We are not interested in modeling transparency, but simply in determining its ultimate impact on market performance. Therefore, in our model, we capture the impact of transparency by simply allowing for the existence of a public signal that is a noisy aggregation of the signals held by all the players in the market and which, given our rational expectations equilibrium, provides information about the anticipations of all market participants. In contrast with the market microstructure literature on market transparency, since the precision of the public signal can be varied continuously, our model allows us to study the marginal impact of decreasing uncertainty by increasing transparency.
There have also been a number of papers that study the impact of reducing uncertainty directly by announcing a public signal that is independent of the private signals held by investors. Morris and Shin (2002) show that public information may be harmful for expected social welfare in a beauty-contest set up where the payo¤ of an agent decreases in the distance between his action and the actions of the others. The main intuition for their result is that in the beauty-contest set up, public information helps investors achieve coordination, but greater coordination between agents is assumed to be socially irrelevant. 1 Clark and Polborn (2006) focus on situations where individuals care about making the correct choice, but also about the fraction of the population that make the same choice that they do and in which the preferred level of coordination lies between 1=2 and the whole population. They focus on two types of pure strategy equilibriaone in which agents ignore their private information in favor of the public information, and one in which every individual chooses the action that they believe is most likely to be correct. Like Morris and Shin they nd that better public information need not increase players expected utility, but, to the contrary, may even decrease it. This can occur when in the initial situation both types of equilibria exist, and the one with the higher expected utility is the one in which people heed their private information; in this situation, increases in public signal quality can eliminate this equilibrium type, and the remaining equilibrium in which all players follow the public signal may yield a lower expected utility for all players. The same is true for the private signal, as it may cause overcrowding in situations where agents choose the action they believe is most likely to be correct.
There are two important di¤erences between our model and Morris and Shin (2002) and Clark and Polborn (2006) . First, there is no direct coordination e¤ect in our model. As a result, the positive e¤ect of decreasing uncertainty would be related to a decrease in the adverse selection problem which would a¤ect their trading behavior. Second, we consider a rational expectations equilibrium set up in which a small number of investors engage in imperfect competition. We model the strategic behavior of investors and explore the way it is a¤ected by the existence of a more valuable information.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyse the equilibrium e¤ects of improving information provision on market performance. We conclude in Section 5. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 Svensson (2006) shows that this result holds only for special cases and that when the parameters of the Morris and Shin (2002) model take reasonable values the condition for public information to be welfare decreasing is violated. Other papers have challenged Morris and Shins result by showing that the increase in public information announcements would increase the expected social welfare if sent only to a proportion of agents (Cornand and Heinemann, 2008) , in economies with investment complementarity, or in economies featuring monopolistic competition among heterogeneously informed rms (Angeletos and Pavan, 2004 and 2007) . 5 
The model
Consider a market where Q units of a risky asset are traded. There are n investors who participate in this market. The value of the risky asset is denoted by and is unobserved by the participants.
However, each investor has some information about . Based on the information available to them, each submits a demand function and in equilibrium total demand will equal the quantity supplied, Q.
As in Kyle (1989) , we consider a rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect competition among agents in which investors submit downward sloping demand curves. The main di¤erence between our model and Kyles is that, in our model, investors not only observe a private signal about the value of , but also observe a common public signal, which is itself an imperfect signal of the average of individual private signals.
Information structure
We assume that prior to trading each investor i receives two imperfect signals about the value of the risky asset, . The rst signal is private for investor i, and is denoted by s i . The second signal, denoted by S; is a public signal observed by all investors. Both signals are noisy and all random variables are assumed to be normally distributed. So, we suppose that
and
From these expressions we can see the two means available to regulators for reducing uncertainty about the value of a nancial asset. 2 One option is for standards on information dissemination of publicly traded assets to be tightened. In our setup this is captured by reducing
2
. The second alternative is to enhance the transparency of nancial markets by giving access to more information about the average private signal in the market. This can be done by providing information on past transactions in the market. In our model this is captured by a decrease in 2   . 3 2 Note that we do not focus on a trade-o¤ between these two types of signals, but rather on their respective impacts on market performance. See Morris and Shin (2002) , Clark and Polborn (2006) for models in which agents weigh the relative benets of the two types of information. 3 Modeling transparency in this way allows us to study the marginal impact of decreasing uncertainty. In the marketmicrostructure literature transparency is always dened as the information that the market or some participants should we will explore the impact of information aggregation and market transparency on the market equilibrium and the trading strategies of agents.
In practice, even complete access to information about past trades may not provide investors with all existing information. This is because information on past trades is a compound of private signals and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Investors can be motivated to trade either to capitalize on valuable trading opportunities they perceive given their fundamental information or for liquidity needs. As a result it is probably most appropriate to think of as the sum of two variables: one that captures information-based trading and one that captures liquidity-based trading. We are of course interested in the incentive to trade that is marginal relative to the liquidity-based motivation.
Agents
We suppose that agents have CARA preferences with r denoting their risk aversion coe¢cient. Given the assumption of normally distributed random variables, this implies that preferences can be denoted by the mean-variance representation. An agent who trades a quantity x i has expected utility of:
where W is some initial wealth, w i is agent is initial endowment of the stock, and F i corresponds to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock that the agent receives before participating in the market. I denotes all information available to the investor. The initial endowment w i allows us to model the supply of shares in the market. We assume that P i w i = Q: We assume that F i is private information for the agent and that it follows distribution N (0; 2 F ). The introduction of F i adds a second motivation for trading as in Glosten (1989) . Without these shocks, the rational expectations equilibrium would be fully revealing and so traders would have no incentive to gather information. The result would be a disclose in order to increase the information shared between agents. Essentially this boils down to providing a public signal about the signal of others.
no-trade equilibrium as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . 4 With the inclusion of F i ; higher demand by a particular agent may be interpreted as being the result either of good information or a large negative liquidity shock.
The precision of the liquidity shock will a¤ect the existence of the linear equilibrium. We prove in what follows that unless this shock is su¢ciently noisy, agents may refuse to take part in the market.
Equilibria with linear downward sloping demand
As in Kyle (1989) we focus on linear equilibria by assuming that investors submit linear demand functions. Under simplifying assumptions of normal and independent idiosyncratic shocks and a CARA utility function, we are able to compute a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium with downward sloping demand curves. The equilibrium is derived by maximizing each agents expected utility against the residual demand curve. Indeed, in the spirit of rational expectations equilibria, after making conjectures about the optimal demand functions of his competitors, each agent will choose his optimal strategy by acting as a monopsonist with respect to a residual demand curve conditional on these conjectures.
Let us suppose that agent i conjectures that each agent j 6 = i has the following inverse demand function :
Since, the equilibrium price is the same for all agents, summing the demand functions for all j 6 = i, dividing by (n 0 1), and then using the market clearing condition, P j6 =i x j = 0x i ; yields the inverse residual demand function for agent i:
where F 0i and s 0i represent the liquidity shocks and private signals for all agents other than i respectively. This can be rewritten as 4 The alternative is to introduce noise traders into the model.
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where
. y i represents the indirect information that agent i can infer about the other investors strategies given his demand function x i (1) and the equilibrium price p. When the
and the market equilibrium is fully informative. y i is a su¢cient statistic for the trading motivations of agents. Its two components represent the di¤erent trading motivations of agents alluded to above. The rst term captures the information-based trading motive, while the second represents the liquidity-based motive. If an agent only observes y i , he has no way to distinguish between these two motives. The role of the public signal, S, as we have dened it here is to provide a noisy signal about the rst term of y i which allows agents to better distinguish between the two trading motives. 5 Under the rational expectation equilibrium, we will assume that investor i selects his optimal demand function as if he were observing the y i from the residual demand function. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Suppose that agent i faces the residual demand curve associated with some y i0 . He can select the pair (p lies along the new residual demand curve associated with y i = y i1 and that maximizes his expected utility given s i ; S; and y i1 . The optimal demand curve for agent i can, therefore, be constructed by connecting the optimal price-quantity pairs for each value of y i . The optimal demand curve provides an optimal response for all values of s i ; S; and y i even if y i is not directly observed by the investor i.
Formally, for some S; y i ; and s i , agent is problem consists of selecting a demand function x i (p)
that solves the following problem
The rst-order condition is
5 Alternatively, we could model the public signal as being a noisy signal about the liquidity-based trading motives. That is, a noisy signal about the sum of the F j . In this case, enhancing transparency can be achieved by providing market participants better access to information about liquidity-based trading motives of their competitors. This could be achieved for instance by implementing sunshine trading which identies informationless trading (see for instance Admati and Peiderer 1991). and the second-order condition is
In order to further characterize the structure of the demand function, we state the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Given the denitions of y i ; S and s i , and the assumption that all random variables are distributed normally, we have the following
and V ar(jy i ; S;
where X =
Solving the rst-order condition yields the optimal demand function which is of the form conjectured in (4) and which we characterize in the following proposition:
Lemma 2 For strictly positive r; t , and n > 2, if a (linear) rational expectations equilibrium exists, then each agent must submit a strictly decreasing inverse demand curve of the form:
where:
(20)
and k; k 0 ; k 1 ; k 2 and k 3 are dened above.
In order to show that the equilibrium inverse demand function is well-dened, we must write the unknown values of the equilibrium inverse demand function (C 0 , C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 , C 4 , and E) in terms of the parameters of the model (n, r; satised. Since C 0 , C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 , C 4 , and E depend on k; k 0 ; k 1 ; k 2 ; and k 3 which in turn depend on C 1 and C 2 through the value of X = C 2 C 1 F , the problem is somewhat complicated. Using (19) and (20),
F in terms of the parameters of the model (n, r; 
or alternatively,
So if we can show that there exists a (unique) X that solves the above equation and that satises the second-order condition (8), then we can characterize the (unique) equilibrium with linear demand.
The following lemma describes when such an X exists and is unique.
, the equilibrium dened in Lemma 2 is unique and is fully charac-
There is a unique positive X that solves (23) and that satises the second-order condition given by (8 
:
The equilibrium existence condition stems from the second-order condition of the optimality of the trading strategies of agents. Roughly speaking, it imposes that the lower bound on X given by (24) (which is equal to r 2 t " ) is higher than the lower bound given by the second-order condition (which is equal to Intuitively, the equilibrium existence condition states that a linear equilibrium exists when (i)
there is enough noise caused by liquidity shocks, which would make private signals more valuable and increase the likelihood of trading; (ii) agents are su¢ciently risk averse and therefore willing to trade in the market in order to share risk; and/or (iii) the variance of private signals is su¢ciently high that adverse selection problems are minimized.
In the following, we summarize the results about existence of equilibrium that will be helpful when we turn to equilibrium analysis in the following section. Our main focus is on the impact of changes in these variables on di¤erent measures of market performances. We concentrate our analysis on the e¤ect of reducing 2 and/or 2 on market depth, market e¢ciency, and expected welfare. As in Kyle (1985) we dene market depth as the inverse of sensitivity of prices to changes in quantities; that is, the size of an order ow innovation required to change prices a given amount. So market depth provides a measure of the liquidity of the market.
By market e¢ciency we mean the way prices aggregate the available information in the market. We study the impact on these two measures since the objective of regulators is to ensure high quality fair, orderly, and e¢cient 6 markets, and the microstructure literature studying the impact of transparency on market quality generally uses liquidity as a measure of market quality (see for instance Pagano and 
Market depth and price e¢ciency
In order to study the e¤ect of reducing Using (10) and (23), we obtain an expression for the ex-post variance of :
Note that the expression for V ar(jy i ; S; s i ) is written so that it varies with . V ar(jy i ; S; s i ) is increasing in
, which in turn is decreasing 6 See, for example, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
Market depth analysis
In our rational expectations equilibrium set-up market depth is measure by 1=E. The value E measures the way prices change in response to quantity changes and is dened in Proposition 2. The lower is E; the deeper is the market. Using (17), we have:
Note that E is increasing in 2 , and that both its terms are decreasing in X. Hence, E is also increasing in 2 .
We summarize the results for market depth with the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) Market depth, is decreasing in both (ii) As 2 converges to zero, market depth converges to innity. However, as 2 converges to zero, market depth converges to a nite value. In the limit, we have:
(iii) The marginal e¤ect of 2 on market depth is increasing in 2 ; i.e.
7 Note also that in our set-up E is a measure of the e¤ective bid-ask spread.
14 Making the market more transparent increases market depth. Increasing the precision of the prior information available to all investors about asset value also increases market depth, and the marginal e¤ect is increasing in market transparency. This suggests that regulators should somehow link market transparency to an increase in the quality of prior information.
More interestingly, (ii) states that in the limit, as prior information becomes extremely precise, the market becomes innitely deep, while an extremely transparent market would yield a level of market depth bounded from above. This demonstrates the di¤erence between the two alternative ways of improving information provision. While, both generate an increase in market depth, they do so with di¤erent levels of e¢ciency. Increasing the precision of prior information is more e¢cient since doing so would have a direct impact on the trading behavior of agents by a¤ecting the accuracy of all available information. On the other hand, enhancing transparency only inuences agents strategies by a¤ecting the precision of their information about their competitors signals and the information they infer from the equilibrium price. Therefore, we argue that a further increase in the quality of prior information or of private signals has a more important impact on market depth than does a marginal increase in market transparency. Henceforth, working on rules that allow for an improvement in the quality of the information about rms (whether by increasing prior information or even the private signals) would be a more e¢cient way of increasing market depth than would rules that increase the quality of the information of the traders behavior reecting a higher market transparency.
Note, however, that (iii) implies that the two e¤ects reinforce one another. This nding is particularly interesting since almost all of the literature focuses on one or the other of these types of information, whereas our setup considers both. It suggests that a regulator should encourage both types of informational improvements if it wants to achieve greater market depth.
Price e¢ciency analysis
We now consider the e¤ect of changes of 2 and 2 on price e¢ciency. By price e¢ciency we mean the quality of information about the asset value transmitted by equilibrium price. We consider the 15 following measure of price e¢ciency: on e.
Proposition 3 (i) Price e¢ciency is increasing in

2
. e converges to 0 as 2 goes to 0, and to 1 as 2 goes to 1.
(ii) Price e¢ciency is decreasing in . As 2 goes to innity, X goes to r 2 t " and e converges to
The rst part of (i) may seem counter-intuitive in the sense that it states that increasing the quality of prior information reduces price e¢ciency. However, since price e¢ciency measures the ability of prices to transmit signals about the information available in the market, it makes sense that if the available information is of higher quality, prices are less e¢cient as information aggregators. Furthermore, a marginal increase in the quality of information would negatively a¤ect the informativeness of prices. On the other hand, (ii) states that enhancing market transparency by increasing the quality of the aggregate signal (decreasing 2 ) positively a¤ects the informativeness of the equilibrium price.
However, the positive e¤ect of transparency on market e¢ciency is bounded since, in the limit, as 2 converges to zero or to innity, price e¢ciency converges to nite values. As 2 is lowered, it becomes easier to distinguish the informational and liquidity motivations for trading. This allows traders to better assess the information-motivations for trading and so the resulting price is more informative.
8 See Brown and Zhang (1997) for a discussion of the properties of this measure of price e¢ciency. 16 
Equilibrium trade
From the derived equilibrium we have that
If we sum the above expression for all x i , then since P j x j = 0, we have that x i 0 P j x j = x i , which can be written as
Substituting for the equilibrium values of C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , V ar [jy i ; S; s i ], and E and using (23),
we obtain:
Note here that, interestingly, x i does not depend on S: So, the trading quantity of the agent is not a¤ected directly by the public signal. The agents net trade will depend on the di¤erence between his private signal the average signal in the market, the di¤erence between his endowment and the average endowment in the market, and the di¤erence between his liquidity shock and the average liquidity shock. Furthermore, recall that X 2 is independent of Proposition 4 The dispersion of net trades among agents, E(x 2 i ); is given by
and is increasing in X 2 and decreasing in
The above result may seem paradoxical. An increase in 2 lowers the value of the public signal which reduces the relative importance of shared information. It follows that individual demand will rely more on the idiosyncratic information available. This e¤ect tends to increase the amount of trade. However, despite this, there is in fact less trade since there is another more dominant e¤ect.
An increase in 2 increases the adverse selection e¤ect and therefore increases the absolute value of the slope of the demand curve (or equivalently decreases market depth). This reduces trade in the market.
Expected welfare
Finally we analyse the e¤ect of 2 and 2 on expected welfare. We start by dening an agents welfare conditional on all of the available information
By substituting the rst order condition (7) we obtain
where x i is given by (28).
When there is no uncertainty (ie. var(js i ; y i ; S; F i ) = 0), V (s i ; y i ; S; F i ) = E(js i ; y i ; S; F i ) (w i + F i ) = (w i + F i ). That is, when there is no uncertainty the equilibrium price is equal to the value of the asset; also because there is no risk there are no gains from trade. When there is uncertainty, the second and third terms of (29) are non-zero. The second term is negative and it reects the disutility associated with risk. The third term is positive and it measures to what extent trade can mitigate risk. The impact of an increase in variance depends on an agents initial endowment and liquidity shock (w i + F i ). For instance if w i + F i = 0, then agent i is initially not exposed to any risk and so can trade purely in order to take advantage of the uncertainty faced by rival agents.
Using V (s i ; y i ; S; F i ) we can dene the ex-ante expected welfare of an agent as
where the variables, s i , y i , S, and F i have means equal to ; ; ; and 0 respectively, and have variance-covariance matrix given by
Note that V (s i ; y i ; S; F i ) is a quadratic function and so by applying moment generating techniques we can rewrite (30). For tractability we assume that w i = Q n . We summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 5
Assuming that w i = Q n , expected welfare can be written in the following form
where 3 and t are dened in the appendix.
Solving for the impact on expected welfare of reducing To explain what is going on in these gures, we turn back to equation (32) from which it can be seen that expected welfare is made up of mean and variance components. The second term in the exponent of (32), At this point trading becomes more liquidity motivated and the uncertainty e¤ect comes to dominate causing expected welfare to increase as information becomes more precise. 9 As mentioned in the Introduction, other articles have also found that improved information may lower welfare, but these mostly focus on a class of economies that feature externalities, strategic 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the impact on market performance of regulations that would improve the level of information provision in nancial markets. In our rational expectations model we are able to examine what happens to market performance when regulators can provide investors with more accurate prior information by improving the precision of all private signals, and/or can enhance the transparency of the market. We show that the two alternative ways of decreasing uncertainty have the same e¤ect on market depth, but opposite e¤ects on market e¢ciency. Providing more precise 9 Note that the extent to which expected welfare decreases and the point at which expected welfare begins to increase as information becomes more precise depend on 9 , 3, , and H.
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prior information increases market depth and decreases market e¢ciency since adverse selection e¤ects are less relevant. Enhancing market transparency will both increase the market depth and market e¢ciency. The e¤ect of increasing transparency is less important for market depth than the e¤ect of increasing the precision of prior information since in the limit, while very precise prior information results in an innitely deep market, increasing market transparency results in a level of market depth that is bounded from above. The volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal. Finally, we show that starting with very imprecise private signals and/or a very opaque market, improving the precision of all private signals, and/or enhancing the transparency of the market will cause expected welfare to fall up to a point, after which expected welfare will increase.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. To simplify notation we dene the following:
We then let
Our objective is to compute E(Z 4 jZ 1 ; Z 2 ; Z 3 ) and V ar(Z 4 jZ 1 ; Z 2 ; Z 3 ):
Note that all variables are normally distributed, so the joint distribution is
where m = (E(Z 1 ); E(Z 2 ); E(Z 3 ); E(Z 4 )) = (; ; ; ) and 6 is the variance-covariance matrix dened as follows
For notation purposes, let 6 = ( ij ) for i; j = 1; :::4 and 6 01 = ( ij ) for i; j = 1; ::; 4: Moreover, let 6 (04) be the upper left 3 by 3 corner of 6; so
Finally, let 6 01 (04) = ( pq ) for p; q = 1; ::; 3. Since all variables are normally distributed, we have
det(6 (04) ) , 10 and 
1 0 See Hoel (1984).
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For the conditional variance, 2 ; we have
In order to derive the conditional expectation of Z 4 ; we need to derive the inverse matrix of 6 (04) :
We present 6
01
(04) as follows:
From (34) and since Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that we have:
Hence, we can rewrite the rst-order condition in (7) in order to nd a relationship between x, a demand quantity, and, p, the equilibrium price which should not depend on y i : Since V ar [jy i ; S;
k , we obtain the following relationship:
Isolating p, we obtain the following inverse demand function:
Since by assumption:
matching the arguments of the two above equations, we get
The expression for C 1 is as in the Lemma. Subbing this into the other expressions, solving, and simplifying, we obtain the expressions in Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. From (24), the right side of this equation is positive. So, the left side must also be positive and consequently X must be strictly bigger than r 2 t " : Now in order to show the existence of a solution to (24), we only need to show that the left-and right-hand sides dened as functions of X cross at least once. To do this note that at X = r 2 t " , the left-hand side of (24) is 0 and is lower than the right-hand side which is strictly positive. On the other hand, when X goes to innity, the left-hand side goes to innity and is bigger than the right side which is nite.
Since both sides are continuous functions in X; there exists at least one solution to this equation.
Note also that the left-hand side is linear and strictly increasing in X while the right-hand side is strictly increasing and concave in X for all X > r Proof of Proposition 4. Since all variables are independently and normally distributed. We have:
which can be written as follows
with the vector t is such that
h1; 1i is the dot product and 1 is a 4 2 4 matrix dened as follows 
